Lessons Learned for the Future As of Fall 2006, UHN's MOE/MAR Steering Committee determined that the organization was ready to implement MOE/MAR at the two remaining clusters (Transplant and Medical-Surgical ICU) . At the same time, there are plans to implement MOE/ MAR at several of UHN's strategic partners in the Toronto area. Both decisions reflect the Steering Committee's view that its implementation methodology has now been fine-tuned.
With a strong sense that MOE/MAR and its implementation have been a resounding success, and now having had the opportunity to reflect as we produced the series of papers for this issue of HQ, we take this opportunity to offer 10 additional insights that have either not yet been discussed or are worthy of emphasis here.
Flexible, systematic change strategies are essential:
Heading into a change as profound as MOE/MAR, UHN leaders found it helpful to have a clear sense of how the change process should unfold. While not the only way to think about the change process, the four-stage framework presented in the paper "Transforming Healthcare Organizations" (see p. 10 in this issue) provides a systematic way of ordering the various change activities while not hamstringing change leaders when faced with unexpected events. Although this framework was not explicitly discussed as UHN initiated the MOE/MAR project, the four stages While it would be an overstatement to suggest that UHN leaders were walking with their eyes closed -in which case it would have been very wise to take small steps -in fact, there was little in the healthcare management literature at the time to guide UHN's MOE/MAR implementation. Thus, UHN made the explicit decision to proceed through a cycle of plan, implement, review and learn (to be repeated). While UHN leaders hope others will benefit from these experiences, both positive and negative, we would still maintain that complex change needs to be rolled out incrementally. This not only allows for technical problems to be worked out before infecting an entire organization, but it also builds the organization's confidence and appetite for change.
Develop and support business continuity capabilities:
Although MOE/MAR was intended to reduce risks to patients, it is now clear that substantial system changes, such as MOE/MAR, could, in theory, temporarily increase risks. One need only imagine a world not too far in the future (we hope) when physicians, nurses and pharmacists in training have never worked in a non-MOE/MAR environment.
The risk in such a scenario exists when a technical system failure requires clinicians to turn to alternative, paperbased medication ordering. Any organization that relies on technology to the extent that UHN does must ensure that backup processes exist and that clinicians turn quickly and naturally to them when required. And, as UHN learned during its less-than-fully-successful pilot, procedures must be put in place -and resourced (e.g., with additional staff ) -to enter paper orders when computer-based systems come back on-line. In general, project managers and system designers must be astute scenario planners, asking a series of creative "what if " questions (e.g., "How will paper orders get entered into the system?") in order to protect the organization from an overdependence on technical systems. 8. No computer-based system fully replicates human judgment or is foolproof: One of the challenges for designers of computer-based decision support is that the knowledge upon which it is based has to be codifiable. That is, it must be possible to transmit this knowledge to others through manuals, specifications, regulations, rules and procedures. In the case of MOE/MAR, clinician knowledge had to be codifiable in order for system designers to build that knowledge into the system (e.g., which medications are needed for order sets.) Tacit knowledge, in contrast, is semi-conscious or subconscious and is held in people's heads (Leonard and Sensiper 1998) . To the extent that not all clinical judgment and knowledge can be built into MOE/MAR (e.g., a range of narcotic dosages is often provided in post-operative orders to allow nurses discretion in determining appropriate levels of analgesia), or at least not from the start, clinicians must remain vigilant about decision-making. A culture of questioning the system when it does not "feel right" must be developed and supported. Related to the previous point, it must always be recognized that no computer-based system is foolproof, entirely mechanical, nor can it be fully divorced from (bad) human judgment and human error. Again, it is critical that MOE/ MAR training ensure against mindlessness -the human tendency to operate on "autopilot" (Langer 1989) . Even the best systems provide non-sensible recommendations -which should be challenged by clinicians -but some physical clinician-patient interactions may still provide opportunities for medical error. Thus, while MOE/MAR promises to reduce risks to patients, it can only best do so when it is part of a complete system of proper technology design and clinician/user mindfulness. 9. Project Management should be a broad-based corporate capability: The Project Management function at UHN, prior to MOE/MAR, was viewed too narrowly. As the papers in this issue of HQ make clear, strong project management capabilities were critically important for bringing disparate divisions and clinical areas together, and for MOE/MAR coming in on-time and on-budget. The enormity of this feat should not be discounted given that MOE/MAR represented uncharted terrain for UHN. An unanticipated benefit of UHN's experience is the recognition of how critical, and broadly applicable, project management capabilities are to 
Conclusion
The primary objective of this issue of HQ was to fill a gap in healthcare management writing that UHN's leaders identified as they contemplated the introduction of MOE/MAR at UHN. Specifically, while there was much written about the promise of Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) to reduce adverse drug events -a generic name for UHN's MOE/MAR -there was a dearth of published advice about how to make the business case for CPOE and how to best implement it (for an exception, see Leonard 2004) . What was available was so high-level, or provided such generic aphorisms about managing change (e.g., "get physician buy-in"), that it was of little practical use. Further limiting the utility of published work was that it typically recounted change from a single perspective (e.g., the Information Technology group of a hospital). To address this limitation of prior work, we explicitly acknowledged that different professional and administrative groups would have different perspectives on the design and implementation of CPOE. We urge change leaders to view healthcare organizations as prisms; where you stand influences what you see, and thus, the information upon which your support for, or opposition to, change is based. Finally, this series of papers serves a very (but not exclusively) selfish objective at UHN, namely, the opportunity to learn and the opportunity to learn about learning. Harvard psychologists Argyris and Schön (1978) , commenting on organizational errors, refer to these opportunities as "single-loop" and "doubleloop" learning, respectively.
When the error detected and corrected permits the organization to carry on its present policies or achieve its present objectives, then that error-and-correction process is singleloop learning. Single-loop learning is like a thermostat that learns when it is too hot or too cold and turns the heat on or off. The thermostat can perform this task because it can receive information (the temperature of the room) and take corrective action. Double-loop learning occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization's underlying norms, policies and objectives. (pp. 2-3)
For years, parts of UHN operated as most organizations do, engaged in single-loop learning, correcting the varied organizational errors that occur in all organizations. However, MOE/MAR represents the clearest manifestation of double-loop learning that we can think of -the modification of norms, policies and objectives -such that UHN is better able to ensure patient safety and further develop its capabilities to that end. We hope the experiences and analyses conveyed in this issue of HQ assist healthcare leaders in doing the same for their organizations.
